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PURPOSE: The Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-10.1 series of publications is the primary doctrinal reference for tactical-level integrated base defense (IBD). US Air Force IBD is the integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the battlespace to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection (FP).

APPLICATION: This publication applies to active duty Air Force military and civilian personnel and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel when published in the AFRCIND 2 and ANGIND 2. The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive.

SCOPE:

IBD tactical doctrine is a compilation of knowledge and expertise, describing a broad concept of defense that is appropriate in peace, crisis, or war against all threats to include standoff weapons, man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) events. Although this doctrine is authoritative, it is essentially descriptive and not prescriptive, providing procedures and recommendations to complement the judgment of Air Force commanders at all levels. The Air Force relies on the ability of all Service members, support staff, and civilian agencies to contribute to IBD while fulfilling their primary functions, thereby ensuring the continuance of air and space operations in any circumstance.

Preface

To enable IBD, all Air Force personnel will require an understanding of the common responsibility all Airmen bear for force protection and base defense. The Airman's Manual, AFMAN 10-100, consolidates many of the common skills and introduces concepts of operations that enable IBD; all Airmen are responsible for maintaining proficiency in basic "warrior" skills. Proficiency must be maintained regardless of the theater, role, or duty of an individual.

Chapter 1

INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE (IBD) OVERVIEW

1.1.   Overview. US Air Force Integrated Base Defense (IBD) is the integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the force protection (FP) battlespace to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection. IBD tactical doctrine is a compilation of knowledge and expertise and describes a broad concept of defense that is appropriate in peace, crisis, or war.

Figure 1.1. Organizations Supporting the Integrated Base Defense Concept

- Major Commands (MAJCOMs)
- Direct Reporting Units (DRUs)
- Field Operating Agencies (FOAs)
- Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)
- Operational Wings
- Air Base Wings
- Specialized Mission Wings
- Operations Groups
- Maintenance Groups
- Mission Support Groups
- Medical Groups
- Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces
- US military joint Services
- US Federal authorities
- DOD contractor services
- US State authorities
- Host nations
- Civil emergency services
- Civil community leaders
- Civil community
- Media
- Federal, State and Local Agencies

= **EFFECTIVE INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE** → **Ensures Air & Space Operations**

Effective Integrated Base Defense ENSURES Effective Force Protection

1.1.1. IBD forces comprise all military and civilian personnel operating cohesively (Figure 1.1).

1.1.2. **Complementary IBD forces will vary depending on the theater and may include US military joint Services, civilian employees/civil servants, DOD Contractors, government and local law enforcement agencies, civil emergency services, coalition partners, host nations and friendly communities**. The blending of IBD forces' efforts creates unity of effort from which complementary and synergistic effects can flow. Essentially, the teaming of IBD contributors can create a whole, seamless defense effect that is stronger than the defense efforts

of individual contributors. **Ensure that the Staff Judge Advocate is consulted regarding the legality of using complementary IBD forces.**

1.1.3. IBD is a subset of FP and should establish a seamless defense of the air and ground environments.

1.1.4. The achievement of an effective IBD force requires a **determined, collaborative, proactive efforts and that focus on establishing enduring links, integrated plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the execution of realistic, cohesive training** before an adversary can take action. Effective IBD strengthens the Air Force's ability to seize and retain the initiative.

1.1.5. IBD must be viewed as an element of a larger weapons system that relies on the ability of all Service members, support staff and civilian agencies to contribute to base defense without impacting adversely on their primary functions. Therefore a well-defined networked command and control architecture is essential to achieve proactive and responsive integrated base defense. This networked architecture permits rapid information exchange and provides a common operating picture to facilitate accurate, effects-based decisions.

1.1.6. IBD seeks to maximize available forces by employing the elements of this tactical doctrine and fully leveraging current and emerging technology to combat the threat (Figure 1.2). Enhancing the capability of defense forces through improved training/TTPs and the integration of improved technologies can close the "gap." The effectiveness of defensive systems employed should be measured by their ability to achieve the effect desired.

Figure 1.2. Goal: Close the gap

1.1.7. The effectiveness of an integrated base defense system can be measured utilizing a systematic, effects-based approach. One of the systematic tools available is the Systems Effectiveness Assessment (SEA) process. The SEA process uses a systems security engineering (SSE) approach based on risk, consequence, and performance. It identifies the effectiveness of existing and conceptual systems, identifies the risk to resources, and uses modeling and simulation to evaluate the security system. The SEA process is multifunctional in nature, evaluating not just Security Forces but all organizations that play a role in the IBD

plan by identifying system weaknesses and providing leaders with validated quantifiable data, facilitating effective risk management decisions.

1.1.8. Risk Management Process (RMP) (Figure 1.3). RMP is critical to effective integrated base defense. Planning factors will include assessment of assets, the threat and vulnerabilities. RMP will allow the commander to determine countermeasure options and to apply a risk assessment to them. The process will contain a cost and benefits analysis, supported by test and evaluation that enables the commander to make risk management decisions. Further guidance can be found in AFI 90-901, *Operational Risk Management.* Full understanding of the commander's intent guides actions throughout the RMP and assists in developing and executing desired effects. Commanders should realize, however, that some factors in the IBD risk management equation cannot be quantified and stem from operational and tactical art as much as from science."

Figure 1.3. IBD Risk Management Process

Commander's Intent: Drives Planning and Resource Decisions

Desired Effects
Example:

 Neutralize attacks preventing destruction of key operations or death to large concentrations of personnel

Mitigate damage and loss of life

Give priority to operational aircraft

1.1.9. Deriving the probability of defense effectiveness is depicted in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.4. Probability of Defense Effectiveness Model

Probability of Interruption (PI)

Response Too Late

No Timely Detection

Probability of Neutralization (PN)

Response In Time
But *Not* Effective

Start

No Neutralization

Timely Detection

Neutralization

Response In Time
And Effective

Probability of Effectiveness (PE) = PI x PN

1.1.10. Air Force FP doctrine identifies the requirement for every Airman to be trained as a contributor to FP and defines FP as: ***"an integrated application of offensive and defensive activities that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against Air Force air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk."*** In accordance with Joint Vision 2020 requirements for *a Total Force comprising well-educated, motivated and competent people who can adapt*, **Air Force IBD 2020 requires all Airmen to contribute effectively to base defense, whether as a sensor, reporting defense incidents to assist responders, or as an actual responder.** (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5. Force Protection Model

Force
Protection

Command &Control

Awareness

Countermeasures

Threat, Vulnerability & Risk Assessment

Intelligence

1.1.11. IBD is applicable across the entire threat spectrum - from peace through crisis to war operations – in CONUS and OCONUS. (Figure 1.6)

Figure 1.6. Continuum of IBD Operations

Chapter 2

IBD BATTLESPACE AND DOCTRINE

2.1. IBD Battlespace.

Base Physical
Perimeter

Integrated Base Defense
"Area of Influence"

2.1.1. Force Protection battlespace comprises bases, sites, transient forces/locations, and convoys.

2.1.2. IBD battlespace encompasses flightlines, protection level (PL) resources, personnel, cantonment areas, base facilities, and accommodation areas, and extends beyond the physical perimeter to include the base commander's area of influence (Figure 2.1). The area of influence is the area wherein the commander can directly influence operations and will expand and contract depending on friendly force dispositions. Commanders should strive to ensure that their area of influence coincides with the area from which an enemy can impact operations through the use of standoff weapons such as MANPADS, mortars and rockets. *The "Objectives"* that guide IBD forces seeking to dominate the battlespace are to *see first, understand first, and act first.* While the methods used to achieve battlespace dominance will vary depending on the prevailing conditions, the enduring components for success comprise people and technology, working together through the implementation of TTPs and an appropriate training regimen.   *The "Conditions"* will be a point in the operational spectrum as *defined by the strategic, operational, and tactical situation*. For example, an aggressive posture that is effective in combat may not be a suitable method of operation in a crisis or peacetime environment, and vice versa.

2.1.3. Depending upon the theatre and the prevailing circumstances, it may not be possible for a commanders to physically dominate the IBD battlespace with forces directly under their command. IBD is a total force concept, and commanders must liaise with other forces and

agencies (to include host nation forces) to ensure that as much of the battlespace as possible is dominated. In this way, the commander reduces the risk to the defended installation.

2.2. IBD Doctrine. IBD doctrine is aligned with *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, AFDD 1. AFDD 1 establishes general doctrinal guidance for the application of air and space forces in operations across the full range of military operations from global nuclear or conventional warfare to stability operations. It is the premier statement of US Air Force basic doctrine and as such should form the basis from which commanders plan and execute their assigned air and space missions and act as a component of a joint or multinational force. This document is consistent with, and complements AFDD 1, joint publications and DOD directives.

2.3. IBD Objectives. The objectives of IBD, *"See First"*, *"Understand First",* and *"Act First"* provide a central focus for the conduct of IBD and assist leaders at all levels to realize conditions for success. The application of each element or function is directly tied to the others.

2.3.1. *See First*

2.3.1.1. **Relentless Intelligence and Information Capture.** Gather, collate and effectively disseminate information on defense related activity within and beyond the IBD battlespace.

2.3.1.2. **Detect and Identify Threats.** Analyze collated information and determine likely threats. Maintain an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition capability.

2.3.1.3. **Predict Threat Course of Actions (COA).** Use planning tools to process information and deductions and arrive at likely threat COAs.

2.3.2. *Understand First*

2.3.2.1. **Identify Vulnerabilities.** Critically assess the effectiveness of the defense that is in place. Aggressively examine the integrity of the defense, know the weaknesses that exist, and plan accordingly.

2.3.2.2. **Know and Manage Risks.** Where the burden of a shortfall exists in the defense, ensure that it is carried unobtrusively and in a manner that minimizes the risk to assets in priority order. To minimize risk, manage any shortfall commensurate with the emerging situation and changes in defense resources.

2.3.3. *Act First*

2.3.3.1. **Determine Options.** Identify broad COAs open to IBD defenders to meet the perceived threat. Consider each COA in terms of the defense mission.

2.3.3.2. **Decide First.** Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, the decision must be a logical result of the analysis process. The absence of ideal conditions, such as when defense forces are undermanned, does not preclude the selection of the best COA in the prevailing circumstances.

2.3.3.3. **Act to Remove Threat.** Action to remove a threat could be the initiating of a lethal or non-lethal engagement at a time and place of the Air Force's choosing. Equally, amending the defense posture and thereby rendering ineffective an adversary's preferred line of attack constitutes acting to remove a threat.

Chapter 3

CAPABILITIES ESSENTIAL TO INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE

3.1. Capabilities Essential to IBD. The capabilities essential to IBD (Figure 3.1) represent those actions necessary to successfully plan, program for, and execute IBD operations. IBD is an effects-based defensive posture, not compliance-based, therefore these elements are not in a fixed sequence and the order will be situation-dependent. At any given time, one or more of these elements could be more important than others, and many of these elements impact upon and support each other. The following sections examine the elements in more detail. The concept behind each element is explained and examples provided of how the elements may be applied to IBD operations. The examples are not intended to be an exhaustive checklist. The application and methods through which the IBD essential elements can be achieved are infinitely variable depending on the prevailing threat, threat state, environment, friendly forces available, rules of engagement, applicable laws, and other factors that characterize the battlespace.

Figure 3.1. Capabilities Essential to IBD

3.2. Deceive. Deception can play a significant role in the success of IBD. However, to be effective deception methods need to be varied and one must ensure that they are detectable to the enemy. In practice, deception can: (a) mask the movement of Air Force and friendly forces' assets, (b) cause the adversary to miscalculate Air Force defense posture, (c) mislead the adversary as to Air Force key/critical assets and vulnerable areas, (d) cause the adversary to misjudge where defenses are strong and where they are weak, (e) clear the way for a counter-

strike by misleading the adversary as to our intentions, (f) slow the adversary and thereby assist Air Force IBD in seizing the initiative, and (g) be achieved through a mixture of overt and covert defense forces and defensive measures.

3.2.1. ***Achieving Deception***. The means by which deception may be achieved are limited by the level of innovation shown by Air Force personnel and by their determination to apply the additional effort necessary to achieve the effect. To prevent confusion, when a decision is made to employ deception in a defense, it is critical that all defenders and friendly forces are aware of the overall scheme of the deception. Used effectively, deception can serve to channel the adversary into areas of the defenders' choosing where they can be detected more easily and apprehended or engaged. ***Deception*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.2.1.1. Consult with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) on legal implications of actions designed to achieve deception.

3.2.1.2. Avoid setting patterns in the scheme of defense; remain agile and unpredictable.

3.2.1.3. Effect a tactical deception plan; employ decoy defensive posts, obstacles, and security lighting.

3.2.1.4. Consider periodically moving mobile key assets to alternate secure areas.

3.2.1.5. Conduct defensive surge operations at random times.

3.2.1.6. Conduct joint operations in partnership with host nation, local, state, and federal agencies.

3.2.1.7. Use information operations to present a skewed image of the defense.

3.2.1.8. Employ psychological operations and disinformation programs via the media.

Figure 3.2. Use of Camouflage

3.2.1.9. Use positive Public Affairs campaigns to advertise the strength and effectiveness of cooperation between the Air Force and community within the IBD battlespace.

3.2.1.10. Apply camouflage to personnel, facilities, and resources to hide assets from view (Figure 3.2). Take care to avoid drawing attention to vulnerable areas.

3.2.1.11. Incorporate an aggressive random antiterrorist measures (RAM) program coordinated through the installation Threat Working Group (TWG).

3.2.1.12. Order personnel to report for duty with personal deployment equipment and wearing the prescribed duty uniform, to enable equipment readiness checks to take place and contribute to deception as to Air Force deployment plans.

3.2.1.13. Conduct the surface movement of Air Force assets between units randomly at night.

3.2.1.14. Accommodate the maximum number of personnel in on-base quarters--deceive an opponent as to the true size of the Air Force presence.

3.2.1.15. Employ neighborhood watch signs, military working dog teams, remote cameras, patrol cars, and other visible defense tools to contribute to deception through lending an impression of increased awareness across a larger group of IBD contributors.

3.2.2. *All Airmen.* Know that deception offers one of the best ways to complicate adversary action.

3.3. Deter. For deterrence to be effective, potential adversaries must perceive the Air Force has the capability to mobilize, deploy, and operate as a cohesive team on the ground as in the air, and sustain combat operations in unified action with other IBD contributors. IBD training, therefore, is central to success in deterring the would-be aggressor. We train the way we intend to fight because our historical experiences amply show the direct correlation between realistic training and success in operations. The highest quality training of the individual and the team is essential. Sustaining training is critical, as Airmen will fall back on their training when under pressure in combat or when fatigue sets in on protracted operations. Whether in the "fog of war" or under stress in peacetime situations, Airmen at every level must understand how we operate to enable them to innovate and regain the initiative when the unexpected happens.

3.3.1. *Achieving Deterrence.* Professionalism and determination are keys to achieving deterrence in IBD. Airmen must be aware that, at any time, they are potentially under surveillance by an adversary intent on assessing the Air Force's weaknesses and strengths. The best deterrence will be achieved through the possession of true capability and the professional execution of well-constructed plans that, in accordance with IBD principles, are integrated widely with all friendly elements in the wider battlespace. *Deterrence* Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – *Commanders' Considerations*:

3.3.1.1. Standardize the appearance of military presence at installation entry points so that no point appears weaker than the other.

3.3.1.2. Avoid set pattern operations and use variable timings for recurrent activities to keep an adversary off balance and unnerved.

3.3.1.3. Ensure Airmen are well drilled, dressed, and equipped commensurate with the environment and the threat.

3.3.1.4. Implement owner/user checks and inspections of assigned facilities to help detect and deter illegal/unauthorized entry and lessen the probability an adversary can remain undetected.

3.3.1.5. Display a professional, well-trained, fully capable force and consider random high-profile demonstrations of increased defense postures.

3.3.1.6. Maintain, through an uncommitted reserve, the ability to rapidly present a strong show of force.

3.3.1.7. Employ obstacles and barriers, and harden facilities to clearly make success in an attack less likely.

3.3.1.8. Erect fences and display warning signs in accordance with AFI 31-101 (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3. Fence Barriers with Warning Signs

3.3.1.9. Maintain physical security and counterintelligence capabilities across the operational and threat spectrums. Leverage heightened awareness through an active community relations program.

3.3.1.10. Employ military working dog (MWD) teams as a deterrent in high visibility areas.

3.3.1.11. Publicize the close relationship between city, county, and state police agencies with Air Force.

3.3.1.12. Use warning signs to influence the right behavior (i.e., "WARNING VIDEO TAPING IN PROGRESS", "WARNING VEHICLE IMMOBILIZATION DEVICES ARE IN USE", "DO NOT PROCEED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL", etc).

3.3.1.13. Install/maintain robust perimeter fences—limit adversary choices of entry.

3.3.1.14. Consider implementing personnel augmentation as necessary.

3.3.1.15. Apply protection measures and capabilities tailored to the local defense environment and mission requirements.

3.3.1.16. Be aware that seemingly minor incidents may be connected with more sophisticated adversarial operations. Enforcement and prosecution at the minor end of the incident spectrum can deter major incidents.

3.3.2. *All Airmen*. **Help to create an expanded base "virtual perimeter," that can add greatly to the protection of people and Air Force assets, through being threat aware whether on or off base and whether on or off duty**; report incidents or suspicions, even those appearing trivial, immediately.

3.4 Anticipate. To anticipate an adversary's actions before they occur, the IBD Council should estimate the opponents' offensive capabilities, vulnerabilities, and operational design as part of the IBD Risk Management Process. From this they can infer the potential adversary's courses of action, and focus on the most dangerous and those most likely to occur.

3.4.1. *Achieving Anticipation in IBD Planning.* Air Force commanders require an in-depth understanding of the present and hypothesized operational environment to anticipate future conditions. This capability is embodied in the concept of Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA). For now, IBD planners will use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), a major analytic methodology found within PBA. This analysis gives defending commanders the ability to visualize the battlespace from the adversary's perspective. IPB enables commanders and staffs to anticipate the adversary's objectives and courses of action and helps determine what control measures to use in mitigation efforts. Commanders use every resource available to offset an attacker's advantage of surprise. With threats identified through the IPB process, defensive measures can be targeted accurately to safeguard known vulnerabilities. Planning is the fundamental element necessary for successful preparation of the battlespace. Commanders must apply effective planning principles to any IBD mission tasking. The plan must be understood by all forces in order to maintain effective command and control, to carry out critical tasks, meet established time lines, and establish routines in defense. The plan must be detailed, yet flexible. See Attachment 2.

3.4.2. *Achieving Anticipation in IBD Operations.* The need for anticipation extends beyond preparatory planning. In the course of an operation, all Airmen require interoperable, secure communications media through which they can pass defense information in an accurate and

timely manner.   This will ensure defenders' situational awareness and will enable the concentration of defensive forces in positions of advantage.

3.4.3.   ***Planning and Operations Overview.***   Successful anticipation is most likely to be achieved when commanders have completed a comprehensive visualization of the battlespace from the adversaries' perspective (Red Teaming, Threat Assessments, Vulnerability Assessments, Force-on-Force exercises, modeling and simulation) and through maintaining real-time situational awareness among all Airmen.   Intelligent anticipation by IBD forces can compel opponents to commit to a course of action before they are fully prepared to do so and present opportunities for success.   ***Anticipation*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.4.3.1.   Know and use IPB analytical planning methods across the IBD operational spectrum.

3.4.3.2.   Organize and configure forces to obtain and pass timely intelligence information and warnings.   Disseminate such information as necessary to enable every Airman to be prepared.   Ensure intelligence is classified at a level that is useful.

3.4.3.3.   Consult, integrate, and train proactively, leveraging all agencies (military and civilian) that can enhance the strength of IBD.

3.4.3.4.   Maintain a seamless security, defense, and ground intelligence capability from peacetime operations through crisis to war operations, bearing in mind that irregular adversaries may use criminal means to further their goals at any point in the operational spectrum.

3.4.3.5.   Prepare plans to ensure clear communication links between Air Force response forces and responders from all friendly forces.

3.4.3.6.   Incorporate force protection into installation staff functions.

3.4.3.7.   Initiate an IBD program similar to the Air Force Operational Risk Management (ORM) Program whereby for every planned activity, personnel undertake an assessment to ascertain its impact upon the base defense posture.   Such a program should bring IBD into the perpetual awareness of all IBD force members, core and complementary.   Further guidance on ORM can be found in AFPD 90-1 *Operational Risk Management* and its supporting documents.

3.4.3.8.   Incorporate Force Protection Condition (FPCON) procedures into contracts with civilian organizations.

3.4.4.   ***All Airmen.***   Know the actions to be taken in the event of an incident, to safeguard Air Force assets and personnel, and ensure air and space operations can continue unhindered.

3.4.5.   ***All Airmen.***   Know the Air Force elements and other contributors, civilian and military, that comprise the IBD team.

3.5. Deny. Denying the adversary the components they need in order to attack will dent their confidence of success; even if determined to proceed with an attack, they may be forced to do so by a route or means that places them at increased risk.

3.5.1.   ***Achieving Denial.***   Having made some anticipatory conclusions, based on IPB and Risk Management Process, commanders should have a clear view as to the attack components that they should seek to deny the adversary. ***Denial*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.5.1.1.   Deny an adversary space for maneuver and firing points for their weapons by dominating their optimum avenues of approach and key terrain as identified through IPB. Figure 3.4 provides examples of possible covert avenues of approach onto an installation.

Figure 3.4. Potential Covert Avenues of Approach

3.5.1.2.   Disrupt hostile forces' operations through aggressive, proactive intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Deny them the time, conditions, safety, and stability to organize, plan, train and equip themselves for operations against the installation and resources.

3.5.1.3.   Science/technology-based sensors can play a part in achieving the denial of key terrain, but they have limited value in complex terrain, such as busy urban areas, where the Air Force personnel awareness of IBD forms the first effective line of defense.

3.5.1.4.   Achieving the cooperation of local authorities, as envisioned in IBD, is likely to demand significant effort as a foundation of trust and communication will need to be established before the benefit to Air Force defense is fully realized.

3.5.1.5.   With cooperation, the Air Force can better secure the wider battlespace and deny an adversary the opportunity to close undetected, within the effective range of their weapons.

3.5.1.6. Denial requires people who are alert and inquisitive, and able to interact with their local community.

3.5.1.7. Enforce programs to deny information to an adversary (e.g., OPSEC, COMSEC, COMPUSEC, INFOSEC, etc).

3.5.1.8. Employ environmental design to realize defense opportunities (Figure 3.5).

3.5.1.9. Emplace removable barriers where environmental design is prohibitive.

3.5.1.10. Contact local residences and businesses that are in close proximity to the installation perimeter fence and enlist help in reporting suspicious activities.

3.5.1.11. Institute programs to foster working relationships between the military and local city, county, state, and federal civilian emergency response agencies.

3.5.1.12. Reduce access to minimum necessary for non-essential personnel by using coded ID cards (e.g., cards only valid for a controlled time period or for only part of a base area).

Figure 3.5. Curbs, Ditches, Berms, Walls and Bollards

3.5.2. *All Airmen*. Protect classified and other sensitive information to deny any adversary a crucial advantage, employ locks, lights and alarms, be "threat aware," and know the channels for reporting incidents or suspicions.

3.5.3. *All Airmen.* Enforce the need to know principle; the Air Force will be better postured to neutralize a threat if the adversary is starved of the information they are seeking. Strict adherence to Air Force security procedures can frustrate an adversary to the point where they will look elsewhere for an easier target.

3.6. Detect. Detection of hostile elements may arise through observation of the battlespace or through deductions made following an analysis of the battlespace (see "Anticipate"). IBD forces need to see the whole battlespace, fusing their observations and findings into a comprehensive common operational picture (COP). Information that is important to IBD will be immersed in the vast background clutter created by the environment, including the populace. Defenders must use relevant information and discard the irrelevant to produce an effective COP. Intelligence is a subset of relevant information that focuses primarily on the whole battlespace and assesses both existing and potential adversaries. Intelligence helps produce a common, current, and relevant picture of the battlespace that reduces uncertainty and shortens the commander's decision-making process by providing situational awareness.

3.6.1. *Achieving Detection.* In IBD, all Airmen and friendly forces may contribute relevant information through being aware and alert to the unusual and reporting their concerns. Clear and prompt upward reporting is a cornerstone to the early detection of threats. *Detection* Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – *Commanders' Considerations*:

3.6.1.1. Consider use of sensors that may be human, animal or scientific/technological types (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6. MWD Team and Tactical Sensors

3.6.1.2. Employ all sensors (physical or CBRNE**)** in a seamless, interlocking screen looking out into the battlespace to a depth that exceeds the reach of an adversary providing reliable real-time assessment.

3.6.1.3. Posture resources to observe/occupy key terrain (e.g., position forces in elevated observation posts, such as control towers)

3.6.1.4. Conduct cooperative liaison and operations with adjacent friendly forces such as sister Services, local police forces, emergency responders, government and non-government organizations.

3.6.1.5. Liaison with Air Force (AF) intelligence and AF Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to access and exploit all relevant threat intelligence. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is available through examination of the open media.

3.6.1.6. Utilize the AF Eagle Eyes anti-terrorism initiative to enlist the eyes and ears of Air Force members and citizens. Eagle Eyes start with teaching people about the typical activities terrorists engage in to plan their attacks. Armed with this information, anyone can recognize elements of potential terror planning when they see it. Next, the program provides a network of local, 24-hour phone numbers to call whenever a suspicious activity is observed. Categories of suspicious activities include surveillance, elicitation, tests of security, acquiring supplies, suspicious persons out of place, dry runs, and deploying assets.

3.6.1.7. Conduct routine checks and services to maintain power backup systems for security lighting and technology-based sensors.

3.6.1.8. Train personnel to conduct thorough and systematic vehicle searches. Fully utilize available technology to conduct/enhance vehicle searches.

3.6.1.9. Employ MWD teams and technology to detect explosive devices and drugs.

3.6.1.10. Train personnel to detect surveillance and suspicious activities that may indicate potential hostilities against the installation and its resources. Also train to detect compromise of COMSEC, OPSEC, INFOSEC, etc, and react appropriately.

3.6.1.11. Increase situational understanding, training, and preparation of all personnel to include the civilian population.

3.6.1.12. Employ active and passive technology, such as e-mail, Giant Voice systems, and community access channels to report activity. Maintain capability to override systems to distribute time-critical information.

3.6.2. *All Airmen.* Know and understand intelligence is the key to detection. All Airmen must be able to recognize threat information of intelligence value and must know expected reporting procedures.

3.7. Delay. Success in delaying an adversary can wear them down and enable IBD forces to regain the initiative through positive action, by adjusting the IBD defense posture or through understanding the adversary's intentions more clearly. Gaining time for defenders and penalizing aggressors is the primary function of delay. Air Force personnel are always likely to be thinner on the ground than commanders would wish. Hence, the ability to impose a delay on

potential adversaries can provide a valuable boost to the likelihood of IBD forces detecting an opponent's presence.

3.7.1. ***Achieving Delay.*** Delay cannot be achieved unless there is depth to IBD.   The amount of depth to the defensive arrangements translates into the time penalty that may be imposed on an adversary. The greater the available depth in IBD, the greater the amount of time available for defense forces to detect, interrupt, and neutralize the potential threat. A delay succeeds by forcing the adversary to repeatedly concentrate their efforts to overcome defenses. ***Delay*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.7.1.1. Consider the depth of the defenses.

3.7.1.2. Gauge the amount of delay time gained through implementation of delay mechanisms in facilities, through fences, etc.

3.7.1.3. Assess the relative capabilities of IBD defense forces and the adversary.

3.7.1.4. Examine the physical nature of the battlespace (i.e., terrain, air space, bodies of water, etc.)

3.7.1.5. Evaluate the degree of acceptable risk.

3.7.1.6. Increase internal physical security protection by employing lights, locks, alarms, and hardening.

3.7.1.7. Place obstacles at key/critical facilities and installation entry points to slow an adversary's progress, winning time for responders.

3.7.1.8. Use incremental zones of denial exterior to the installation and around key/critical facilities to provide defense in depth.

3.7.1.9. Consider non-lethal weapons to delay, deny, and neutralize unarmed hostile threats.

3.7.1.10. Use on- and off-base checkpoints and roadblocks to further verify identification of personnel.

3.7.1.11. Relocate operations away from installation perimeter fence.

3.7.1.12. Plan new construction away from perimeter areas to assist in protection.

3.7.1.13. Use speed bumps and serpentine (Figure 3.7) and barriers cabled together (Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.7. Speed Bumps and Serpentine with Backstop for Over-Watch

Figure 3.8. Concrete Barriers Cabled Together

3.7.1.14. Reinforce fence lines with bollards and cables (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9. Fences Reinforced with Bollards and Cables

3.7.1.15. Employ passive and active defense measures to disrupt, channel, or divert the adversary, thus creating the delay necessary to maneuver forces into positions to block/contain the enemy advance and neutralize the threat.

3.7.2. ***All Airmen.*** Employ locks, lights and alarms in accordance with Air Force protection programs.

3.8. Assess. Assessment in IBD has two components. The first is a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the defenses and defense plan based upon the postulated or real threat. This, as with all of the IBD essential elements, should be relentlessly reviewed and updated. The second component to assessment in IBD is the leveraging of all available intelligence. To achieve the objective of *"Understand First"* in IBD, commanders need to visualize friendly forces' dispositions, unidentified elements, and hostiles, together with the battlespace environment comprising terrain, weather and population.

   3.8.1. *Achieving Assessment*. Battlespace visualization is the process whereby the commanders develop a clear understanding of their current state in relation to the adversary and environment, envision a desired end state, and then visualize the sequence of activities that will move their force from its current state to the end state. *Assessment* Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – *Commanders' Considerations*:

      3.8.1.1. Commanders need to know what is happening among the people who live in the battlespace, the key actors who can influence events in the area, as well as friendly and adversary force information.

      3.8.1.2. Consider the military and non-military actions that may occur in the battlespace and any friendly force actions that may trigger a reaction.

      3.8.1.3. Employ counterintelligence technological devices/systems and activities to warn of unauthorized/uncoordinated penetrations of security, and provide real-time, remote assessment capability and warning.

      3.8.1.4. Establish robust links for IBD cooperation with the community, emergency services, and other government agencies, to promote the sharing of information.

      3.8.1.5. Use crime trend analysis to formulate defense plans against most likely perimeter threats and resource protection surveys to assess units' protective capabilities, limitations and compliance with security program standards.

      3.8.1.6. Involve IBD core and complementary forces in the exercising of installation support and defense plans to evaluate and determine effectiveness.

      3.8.1.7. Use DOD risk management processes when conducting risk assessments for installation resources. Conduct vulnerability assessments, systems effectiveness assessments, and criticality analyses to determine and assess units' vulnerabilities.

      3.8.1.8. Ensure communication capabilities, commonalities and thorough matrices are available to expedite transmission of information to the proper places in a timely manner.

      3.8.1.9. Conduct "Red Teaming" exercises to assess installation capabilities to protect against an attack across the operational spectrum.

3.8.1.10. Develop crime trend analysis process that takes in account external crime trends for the purpose of determining internal influence and intelligence.

3.8.2. ***All Airmen.*** Report incidents or suspicions promptly; a contribution of information, however small, could provide the vital piece to the commander's assessment picture.

3.9. Deploy. Deployment is the movement of personnel, as individuals or groups, necessary to accomplish mission objectives. The speed of deployment is regulated by the urgency of the situation (i.e., from a routine permanent change of post manning, to an urgent response to a life-threatening emergency). The speed required in deployment can be linked to the ability to delay.

3.9.1. ***Achieving Deployment.*** To most efficiently and effectively deploy, military forces must rehearse, practice, and exercise deployment actions under a variety of conditions and circumstances spanning the spectrum of conflict. ***Deployment*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.9.1.1. Use the common example of a fire drill, consider the other eventualities personnel should be drilled to respond to, such as intruder alerts, casualties and aircraft safety incidents.

3.9.1.2. Bear in mind that even those members of the IBD force who are not required to respond to an incident may still need to redeploy to a position of safety, and this should be rehearsed.

3.9.1.3. Provide depth in defense and maintenance of an uncommitted reserve force are essential to ensuring that the Air Force can retain or, if lost, regain the initiative over an adversary.

3.9.1.4. Providing teaming and realistic training before deploying is vital to success.

3.9.1.5. Consider making defense and security response preparations along first responder lines—always maintain a ready response force.

3.9.1.6. Plan for and practice centralized parking plans that will relieve congestion at installation gates and reduce vehicle search requirements.

3.9.1.7. Consider citizens on patrol programs utilizing radios or cellular phones to report incidents.

3.9.1.8. Consider owner/user arming to enable controlled entry to all facilities.

3.9.1.9. Deploy overwatch capabilities to meet the anticipated threat and ensure backstops and berms are in place to catch rounds that miss their intended target (Figure 3.10).

Figure 3.10. Field of Fire/Counter Fratricide Example

3.9.1.10. Consider consolidation of a single dispatch center for all first responders.

3.9.2. ***All Airmen.*** Know the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, including assembly points, in-place sheltering, or alternate positions to deploy to. Combine a thorough knowledge of the Airman's Manual, installation Integrated Base Defense and Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 10-2 plans, and emergency drills associated with specific workplaces.

3.10. Neutralize. The 'Neutralize' element in IBD seeks to render adversary personnel or material incapable of interfering with Air Force operations.

3.10.1. ***Achieving Neutralization***. Neutralization requires action on the part of the IBD force members who should be ready to employ effective countermeasures against the full array of threats facing units across the threat spectrum. ***Neutralize*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.10.1.1. Ensure defensive fire plans are oriented in accordance with (IAW) the latest assessment of adversary likely courses of action. If forces are not sufficient to defend against likely adversary courses of action, identify and request additional forces that will provide the capability. Some capabilities are not inherent to the Air Force and may need to be requested through the joint or local community.

3.10.1.2. At all points in the operational spectrum, relentless, active IBD operations may render the adversary incapable of attaining their objective(s) and discourage further hostile action.

3.10.1.3. Process adversaries who are detained IAW standard operating procedure (SOPs) to ensure they remain incapable of interfering with friendly force operations.

3.10.1.4. Employ electronically hardened, encrypted radios can neutralize the effects of jamming, interception and interference.

3.10.1.5.   Employ controls, software and user procedures, including security awareness training, to prevent attacks against information systems.   Implementing Department of Defense Instruction 5200.40, *DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP)* and AFIs 10-2001, *Defensive Counterinformation Planning*, *Operations and Assessment*, 33-115, Vol I, *Network Management*, AFI 33-15, Vol 2, *Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network Professionals* can prevent attacks against information systems.

3.10.1.6.   Enforce a base barment letter program can identify and prevent undesirable persons from entering Air Force installations and prevent problems before they start.

3.10.1.7.   Maintain the capability to employ both non-lethal (Figure 3.11) and lethal (Figure 3.12) weapon systems to help ensure that appropriate firepower is available for IBD at all times – employ the use of force continuum.   The ability to conduct precision engagement at extended range will further add to the ability to apply lethal force to legitimate point targets.

Figure 3.11. Non-Lethal Weapons

Figure 3.12. M24 Sniper Weapon System and M4 Carbine w/4X Day Optic Sight used by SF Sharpshooter Teams and Designated Marksmen

3.10.1.8.   Install vehicle-disabling devices to neutralize the dangers and threats associated with gate-running.

3.10.2.   *All Airmen.*   All Airmen should qualify with their assigned firearm and train to be tactically proficient in order to participate in the active defense of their area or augment security personnel in protecting the installation.

3.11. Mitigate.   Mitigation serves to lessen the consequence/severity of the adversary's intent or action across the spectrum of operations.

3.11.1. ***Achieving Mitigation.*** Through appreciating the battlespace from the adversary's perspective (see "Anticipate"), commanders can prepare plans for degradation whereby a small success by an opponent would not prove catastrophic to the IBD defense. ***Mitigation*** Across the Operational Spectrum in IBD – ***Commanders' Considerations***:

3.11.1.1. Harden facilities, construct bunkers, revet aircraft and equipment, or provide other similar protective measures based on threat COAs to lessen the amount of damage personnel and resources may incur (Figure 3.13). Further guidance can be found in AFH 10-222, Vol 14 *Guide to Fighting Positions, Obstacles, and Revetments* and in the Unified Facilities Criteria document UFC 4-010-01, *DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.*

Figure 3.13 Bunker and Aircraft Revetments

3.11.1.2. Use camouflage, cover, and deception (CCD), and distance and shielding to penalize the adversary into expending scarce additional resources and time, and diminish their chances of success.

3.11.1.3. Develop and maintain robust security programs (e.g., personnel, information, industrial, etc.) serve to prevent or lessen the opportunities afforded to an adversary to gain information dominance/superiority.

3.11.1.4. Use preventive medical care (i.e., immunizations, physical assessment, etc.) to lessen the chances of personnel becoming ill, thus reducing the threat posed by natural and man-made health hazards.

3.11.1.5. Disperse key/critical assets to lessen the probability of catastrophic losses in the event of adversarial action.

3.11.1.6. Provide clothing, training, and equipment for IBD forces commensurate with the mission, environment and weather conditions to maximize their effectiveness and survivability and lessen chances of their becoming casualties.

3.11.1.7. Maintain an uncommitted reserve force at all times to quickly regain control should the initiative be lost temporarily to an adversary.

3.11.1.8. Enforce routine checks and maintenance of backup power systems to reduce the effect of an outage, whether caused by adversary action or other events.

3.11.1.9. Ensure key C2 and operations support facilities have redundant capabilities.

3.11.2. ***All Airmen.*** Knowledge and skills based on the content of the Airman's Manual can enable those personnel closest to an incident scene to take immediate actions to prevent the situation from deteriorating and mitigate the effect of adversary action.

Chapter 4

INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE SUMMARY

4.1. Summary. Integrated Based Defense is a concept for protecting our airbases through the full spectrum of air and space operations that relies on the ability of ALL Airmen, support staff, and civilian employees to contribute to the defense of their installation while still fulfilling their primary functions. IBD requires ALL Airmen – not just security forces – to understand the common responsibility they have for force protection and base defense.

4.1.1. The Airman's Manual identifies many of the skills required of an Airman to enable IBD, and it is the responsibility of us all to ensure that we retain our proficiency in basic readiness skills – regardless of the theater, role or duty we are assigned.

4.1.2. IBD provides a seamless continuum of security operations for peacetime through crisis to war. It uses technology wherever appropriate to close the gap in what we can achieve with forces on the ground. Technology provides the networked command and control architecture to fuse together all sensor inputs and provide the commander with a common operating picture. The resulting increase in situational awareness will greatly assist the commander to make the right decisions, quickly.

4.1.3. To keep the initiative from the enemy we must "See First", "Understand First", and "Act First" – the guiding principles used in the planning and conduct of IBD.

RONALD E. KEYS, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Air & Space Operations

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References
DOD 2000.12-H, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Disturbance*
DOD 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*
DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*
DODI 5200.40, *DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP)*
DOD C-5210.41M, *The Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*
UFC 4-010-01, *DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings*
UFC 4-010-02, *DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings*
Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*
Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*
Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*
Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*
AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*
AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*
AFPD 31-3, *Air Base Defense*
AFMAN 10-100, *Airman's Manual*
AFMAN 10-104, Vol I, *Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation*
AFI 10-212, *Air Base Operability*
AFI 10-222, Vol 14, *Guide to Fighting Positions, Obstacles, and Revetments*
AFI 10-245, *The Air Force Antiterrorism Standards*
AFI 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*
AFI 10-2001, *Defensive Counterinformation Planning, Operations and Assessment*
AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations*
AFH 10-2502, *USAF Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning And Response Handbook*
AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*
AFI 31-201, *Security Police Standards and Procedures*
AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*
AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*
AFI 31-304, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*
AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*
AFH 10-2502, *USAF Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning And Response Handbook*
AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*
AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*
AFI 33-115, Vol I, *Network Management*

AFI 33-115, Vol 2, *Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network Professionals*
AFI 36-2225, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Program*
AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*
AFI 71-101, Vol 1, *Criminal Investigations*
AFI 71-101, Vol 4, *Counterintelligence*
AFPD 71-1 *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*
AFPD 90-9, *Operational Risk Management*
AFI 90-901, *Operational Risk Management*
AFPAM 14-118, *Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEF	air and space expeditionary force
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Command
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques and procedures
AO	area of operations
BDU	battle dress uniform
BX	Base Exchange
C2	command and control
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive
CCD	camouflage, cover, and deception
COA	course of action
COMPUSEC	computer security
COMSEC	communications security
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operating picture
EMP	electromagnetic pulse
FP	force protection
IBD	integrated base defense
INFOSEC	information security
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open source intelligence
PBA	predictive battlespace awareness
PL	protection level
SOP	standard operating procedure
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures

Terms

area of influence.   A geographical area wherein the commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 1-02).

area of interest.   That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations.   This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **AOI**. (JP 1-02).

area of operations.   An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces.   Areas of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their personnel. Also called **AO**. (JP 1-02).

area of responsibility.   The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called **AOR** (JP 1-02).

base commander.   In base defense operations, the officer assigned to command a base. (JP 1-02) [*The base commander is responsible for the defense of the installation and organizes and controls all forces assigned to the base to capitalize on their capabilities. These forces must be trained, organized, and equipped to contribute to the defense of the base.*] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

defense force commander.   The senior Air Force commander responsible for the air base normally delegates operational authority to conduct integrated base defense to the defense force commander. The defense force commander exercises command and control through an established chain of command and directs the planning and execution of base defense operations. Also called **DFC**.

force protection.   Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called **FP.** (JP 1-02) [*An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against to Air Force air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.*]{Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, operate in, or transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02).

integrated base defense. The integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the force protection (FP) battlespace to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection. Also called **IBD**.

integrated base defense force. IBD forces comprise all military and civilian personnel operating cohesively and depending on the location it may also include US military joint Services, civilian employees/civil servants, DOD Contractors, government and local law enforcement agencies, civil emergency services, coalition partners, host nations and friendly communities

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called **IPB**. (JP 1-02).

predictive battlespace awareness. PBA is the understanding of the operational environment that allows the commander and staff to correctly anticipate future conditions, assess changing conditions, establish priorities and exploit emerging opportunities while mitigating the impact of unexpected adversary actions. PBA results from combining IPB, ISR planning and synchronization, and ISR management into a coherent framework that maximizes the capabilities of ISR assets in all environments. Also called **PBA**.

protection level. The PL system identifies specific Air Force resources that must be secured and the level of security dedicated to those resources. This system recognizes owners and users of these resources must accept varying degrees of risk. Assigned protection levels provide the basis for programming security manpower and equipment. Also called **PL**.

red teaming. Red teaming is a technique that involves viewing a potential target from the perspective of an attacker to identify its hidden vulnerabilities, and to anticipate possible modes of attack. This usually involves the use of US Special Operations Forces to conduct penetration tests that replicate a real-world adversary who is trying to gain access to the installation to achieve a specific purpose (e.g., intelligence gathering, theft, disrupt air operations). However, Red Teaming can be successfully conducted at a lower level with the use of sand tables, round table discussions and syndicate work - it does not have to involve the use of force on force specialist teams.

standard operating procedure. A set of instructions covering those features of operations, which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called **SOP**. (JP 1-02).

Attachment 2

PLANNING FOR IBD

A2.1.   IBD planning is essential for mission success.   Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*, describes a sample base defense plan in a Joint Operation Order format (see below) which may be used in IBD planning and mission execution.   An operation order is a directive issued by the commander to subordinates to aid subordinates in understanding the mission, the concept of the operation, and their assigned tasks.   The commander should normally issue their operation order to key staff members, subordinate leaders, and any others affected by the plan.   Upon receiving the commander's order, subordinate commanders issue their operation order.   Whenever possible, visual aids in the form of sketches, maps, and terrain models should be used for better understanding.   Operation orders should be as detailed as possible to ensure full understanding of the mission and assigned tasks.   IBD operations orders may be developed at different levels depending on the level of the unit executing the given operation. Key to any operation order is the commander's intent.   Absent any other guidance, the commander's intent should allow subordinates to carry out their assigned mission.

A2.2. 5-Paragraph Format

1.   SITUATION: Provide information essential to the IBD forces permitting complete understanding of the situation.

   a. Enemy Forces: Include pertinent information gathered through AFOSI, SF and IN channels.   Describe the enemy's most likely and most dangerous course of action (COA).   When possible include a sketch of possible enemy courses of action.   Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against US government interests in the area of operations.

   b. Friendly Forces: Provide information IBD forces need to accomplish the IBD mission.   Include host nation, local law enforcement and other agencies in support of the IBD mission.

2. MISSION: Provide a clear, concise statement of the IBD mission to be accomplished and the purpose (who, what, where, when, and why).   The commander's intent may be introduced as an element of this section and is further developed in the execution element of the operations order.

3. EXECUTION: Provide the commander's intent (derived from the planning process), concept of the operation, specific assignments of forces, and any coordinating instructions. The concept of operations provides the IBD concept of operations based on the COA statement from the decision-making process and describes the type or form of operations and designates the main effort.   The concept describes the employment of major units and other major elements or systems within the operation (intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance assets, security elements, engineer assets, and air defense). The commander uses this section to clarify the concept and ensure unity of effort.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: Outline required IBD support instructions and arrangements. The support concept includes but not limited to supply, services, medical evacuation and hospitalization, and personnel support.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: Provide information of location of critical IBD command and control facilities (including alternate locations), chain of command, required reports, formats, and times the reports are submitted.

ANNEXES:
A. Task Organization
B. Intelligence
C. Operations
D. Logistics
E. Personnel
F. Public Affairs
G. Civil Affairs
H. Engineer Support
J. Command Relationships
K. Command, Control, and Communications
L. Force Protection
M. Host-Nation Support
N. NBC Defense